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In the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah 
J. L. GIBSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT 
BOARD, LEROY E. COWLES, 
CHARLES H. SKIDMORE, JOSEPH 
CHEZ, ALEX JEX, MILTON B. 
TAYLOR, D. A. WOOTTON, and J. R. 
SMITH, Members Thereof, 
Defendants. 
No. 6220 
Answering Brief Of Plaintiff To The 
Defendants' Petition For Rehearing, 
And Supporting Brief 
The defendants have filed a petition for rehearing and 
reconsideration of the decision of this Court heretofore ren-
dered in this case. The decision is reported in 105 P. (2d) 
353. 
The said petition for a rehearing sets forth the follow-
ing alleged grounds: (Defendants' Brief p. 2 and 3). 
"1. That the majority opinion is in error in 
holding that the defendants contended that the 
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word 'contributes' should be construed as meaning 
'has contributed.' 
"2. That the majority opinion heretofore ren-
dered is in error by in effect holding that the lan-
guage of subdivision b of Section 12 of Chapter 85, 
Laws of Utah, 1937, is uncertain and ambiguous 
and as such requires construction or interpretation. 
"3. That the majority opinion is in error in 
holding that by the use of the word 'contributes' 
the legislature intended to mean 'is contributing.' 
"4. That the majority opinion heretofore ren-
dered in this cause is in error in not giving to the 
word 'contributes' its natural and ordinary mean-
ing and in not giving it the same meaning that such 
word is given in Section 21 of Chapter 85 Laws of 
Utah, 1937. 
"5. That the majority opinion is in error by 
in effect substituting in the act the word 'is con-
tributing' for the word 'contributes'. 
"6. That the majority opinion is in error in 
construing the language used in subdivision 'b' of 
Section 12, Chapter 85, Laws of Utah, 1937, to the 
effect that plaintiff is not permanently excluded 
from membership in the Utah State Teachers' Re-
tirement System." 
All of said alleged grounds are argued under the follow-
ing headings and in the following order : 
"THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE 
HERE INVOLVED EXPRESSLY EXCLUDE'S 
THE PLAINTIFF FROM MEMBERSHIP IN THE 
TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM AND 
THEREFORE THE OPINION OF A MAJORITY 
OF THIS COURT IS IN ERROR IN INTERPO-
LATING WORDS INTO THAT STATUTE." (De-
fendants' Brief p. 4). 
"ASSUMING THAT THE LANGUAGE OF 
SECTION 12, CHAPTER 85, LAWS OF UTAH, 
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1937, IS SO UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS AS 
TO PERlVIIT OF OR REQUIRE CONSTRUCTION, 
STILL A CONSTRUCTION SHOULD BE GIVEN 
EXCLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM MEMBERSHIP 
IN THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM." (Defendants' 
Brief p. 12) . 
We believe that the most satisfactory manner of an-
swering their brief will be in the order that it is written and, 
we shall, therefore, do so. 
The defendants on pages 4 and 5 of their brief quote 
from the prevailing opinion as follows: 
"The argument resolves itself as to whether 
the expression 'The State of Utah contributes part 
of the premium' (italics added) is to be read as 'is 
contributing' or as 'has contributed' part of the 
premium. Plaintiff contends for the former con-
structions and defendants contend for the latter 
one." 
Defendants then state on page 5, as follows: 
"At the outset the defendants disclaim any in-
tention of contending that the word 'contributes' 
should be construed as meaning 'has contributed'." 
Such statement amounts to nothing more than quib-
bling. The entire theory of the defendants in this case from 
the outset has been that because the State of Utah at one 
time contributed, which means nothing more or less than has 
contributed, the plaintiff was ineligible to become a member 
of the state system. The facts have been without dispute 
from the beginning that at the time the plaintiff requested 
to be considered a member of the state system the State of 
Utah had ceased to contribute anything on the Teachers' In-
surance and Annuity Association contract. So, regardless of 
how the defendants feel at the present time, the prevailing 
opinion is and was correct in the statement that: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
"The argument resolves itself as to whether 
the expression 'The State of Utah contributes part 
of the premium' (italics added) is to be read as 'is 
contributing' or as 'has contributed' part of the 
premium." 
The only purpose in using the word "is", as we see the 
question, is to emphasize the fact that "contributes" is in the 
present tense and not the past tense. The defendants agreed 
with us in this matter in their first brief and were not in 
accord with the dissenting opinion on the question because 
on page 21 of their first brief they state, as follows: 
"This is true because any teacher holding a 
contract with the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity 
association of America to which the State of Utah, 
or any subdivision thereof, was not contributing or 
had not contributed any part of the premium would 
not be ineligible." (Blackface ours.) 
Such statement can mean only one thing, and that is, 
even if the plaintiff had been the holder of a contract with 
the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of America 
but that the State of Utah had at no time contributed part of 
the premium the plaintiff would then be eligible to be a mem-
ber of the state system. Their statement points out clearly 
that their only contention was then that if the State of Utah 
in this case "has contributed" the plaintiff would be ineligi-
ble. At no place have they heretofore argued that at the 
time the plaintiff made his request to be considered a mem-
ber, that the State of Utah was presently contributing as ex-
pressed in the language "contributes" or "is contributing". 
The above quoted words mean exactly the same thing in plain 
English and it took a statute passed by the legislature of the 
State of Utah to include the future tense, for reasons of con-
venience. Said reasons are so obvious that there will be 
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nothing gained in attempting to point them out. The only 
way that the defendants could prevail in this case would be 
to prove that the word "contributes" means "has contrib-
uted." 
The defendants state: 
-"that if a statute is plain, certain and free 
from ambiguity, then and in ~uch case the courts 
must give effect to the meaning of the language 
used and may not resort to interpretation or con-
struction." (Defendants' brief p. 5). 
The law is as stated in 25 R. C. L.-Statutes-
Section 210 : 
"Construction, it has been said, is the drawing 
of conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond 
the direct expression of the text, from elements 
known from and given in the text,"-"Construc-
tions which are in the spirit, though not within the 
letter of the text; while interpretation is the art of 
finding the true sense of .any form of words. 
Though there may be an abstract distinction be-
tween these terms, it is doubtful whether the dis-
tinction is ever of any practical value. Certainly in 
common usage interpretation and construction are 
usually understood as having the same signifi-
cance." 
The statement of the defendants is incorrect if the law 
is strictly followed because interpretation should not be in-
cluded in their statement if "interpretation is the art of find-
ing the true sense of any form of words." The plaintiff has 
always contended that the law is unambiguous and certain. 
Apparently the defendant now take the same position but 
the fact remains that the plaintiff and the defendants cannot 
agree on what is the meaning of the "plain English" of the 
statute and it seems that all of the members of the Supreme 
Court also cannot agree. Apparently the very fact that 
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there is such a disagreement completely disposes of the argu-
ment of the defendants that the language of the statute is 
not subject to construction or interpretation. 
We do not take issue with the defendants in what they 
claim are the holdings of their cited cases to the effect that 
"when, and only when, a statute is ambiguous and its mean-
ing uncertain that resort may be had to rules of construction 
or interpretation in order to ascertain what the legislature 
meant." (Defendants' brief p. 5). We are still faced with 
the fact, however, that we are at issue as to what the plain 
English of the statute means, so there is apparently nothing 
that can be done, except to do as the parties and the court 
have done. We note that neither the interpretation of the 
prevailing opinion nor the interpretation of the dissenting 
opinion agrees with the interpretation contended for by the 
defendants. We wHl go into this matter a little more fully 
when we reach the proper point. 
The defendants also state, "We most earnestly urge 
that the word 'contributes' may not be. distorted into mean-
ing 'is contributing'." (Defendants' brief p. 8). That 
statement is nothing but pure nonsense. It is too bad that 
the attorneys for the defendants did not get a little help in 
English from their school teacher clients before wasting the 
time of the Supreme Court of this state and the plaintiff in 
such an argument. 
We agree with the defendants that we have a statute 
that provides: 
"Words used in the present tense include the 
future." (Defendants' brief p. 8). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
At this point they seem to admit that the word "contrib-
uates" is in the present tense and is not in the past tense. 
They fail to point out any statute which holds that the pres-
ent tense means the past tense or some space of time gone 
by. We submit that the only "distorting" that could be re-
sorted to in this case would be to hold that "contributes" 
which is the present tense means "contributed" which is the 
past tense. Beginning with the bottom of page 8 of their 
brief the defendants are contending for an entirely new con-
struction of the statute. In other words they have changed 
their theory of the case completely. At no time prior to the 
application for a rehearing have they contended that 
the plaintiff is disqualified because the word "contributes" 
means including as of the date the act took effect and all 
times thereafter. 
The defendants have no right to change the theory of 
their case at the time of a petition for rehearing. The Court 
should not consider the new matters. 
Harrison v. Harker et ux 142 P. 716, 44 U. 541: 
"A question raised for the first time in the pe-
tition and argument for rehearing will not be con-
sidered." 
Swanson v. Sims 170 P. 774, 51 U. 485: 
"A party who went to trial and permitted an 
appeal upon one theory and argued the cause there-
on, could not, on a motion for rehearing secure con-
sideration of a different ground." 
In re Shepherd's Estate 49 P. (2d) 444, 152 Or. 
15-Modified 41 P. (2d) 444, 152 Or. 15: 
"Court could not consider effect of statute first 
called to court's attention in supplemental brief on 
rehearing." 
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Fink v. Weisman, 23 P. (2d) 438, 132 Cal. App. 724, 
aff. in part 18 P (2d) 961, 129 Cal. App. 305, 132 
Cal. App. 724 : 
"Point, first urged on petition for rehearing, 
that appellant interjected certain question into case 
by answer, may be ignored as raised too late." 
Johnson v. International of United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters and Joiners of America, 18 P. (2d) 448, 
54 Nev. 332, den reh 16 P. (2d) 658, 54 Nev. 332: 
"Point first urged on petition for rehearing 
will not be considered. 
Duran v. Springer, 23 P. (2d) 1083, 37 N. M. 357: 
"Supreme Court would not consider objection 
suggested for first time on rehearing questioning 
presumptive effect of tax deed issued within three 
years after recording of tax certificate as one suffi-
cient to invoke inherent power of intervention to 
correct fundamental error where, if deed was inval-
id, holder could apply for new one at any time. 
(Laws 1921, s. 133, s. 452, 455). 
Paine v. Meier & Frank Co., 29 P. (2d) 531, den reh 
27 P. (2d) 315: (Oregon case). 
"Contentions first presented on petition for re-
hearing may be considered waived." 
American Digest System-Appeal and Error-Key 
No. 835 (2): 
"In general questions or points not raised on 
the original hearing will not be considered on the 
rehearing." 
See many cases cited, including many Utah cases. 
The only other question argued in the petition for re· 
hearing is that the Court was wrong in its first decision or 
the statute and a rehearing of that matter has been attempt· 
ed. The Court should likewise not go into this again or re· 
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consider it, as nothing that was not considered at the first 
hearing has been raised. 
Edwards v. Clark 85 P. (2d) 768, 98 U. 140, denying 
rehearing 83 P. (2d) 1021, 96 U. 121: 
"A petition for rehearing of appeal was denied 
on ground that petition did not contain any matters 
which were not considered on original hearing." 
Ward v. Ward 69 P. (2d) 963, 156 Or. 686, denied 
rehearing 68 P. (2d) 763, 156 Or. 686: 
"Petition for rehearing will be denied where 
there are no propositions in petition that court did 
not give full and careful consideration to in opin-
ion." 
1'anagopulos v. Manning 72 P. (2d) 456, 93 U. 215, 
denied rehearing 69 P. (2d) 614, 93 U. 198: 
"Where petition for rehearing presented only 
matters considered on original hearing and further 
examination disclosed no reason why former opin-
ion should be disturbed petition was denied." 
A complete answer to the new arguments of the defend-
ants is, that such meaning or meanings, (that "contributes" 
means including as of the date the act took effect and at all 
times thereafter) could not possibly have been the intention 
of the legislature because they would completely nullify the 
provisio in Subsection "b" of Section 12 of the act. Said pro-
visio is: 
"That every such teacher upon ceasing to be a 
holder of such contract and being otherwise eligible 
to membership in this system shall forwith be-
come a member of the system." 
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The words "upon ceasing to be a holder of such con-
tract" presuppose and show clearly that the legislature in-
tended that every such teacher had the right to do something 
about "ceasing to be a holder of such contract" after the act 
took effect, that is, in the future. 
A holding that a teacher would be forever disqualified 
from becoming a member of the state system if he were the 
"holder of such contract" on the date the act took effect and 
at all times thereafter would prevent every such teacher 
from doing exactly what the provisio in the statute permits. 
Apparently everyone concedes that the words "every such 
teacher upon ceasing to be the holder of such contract" re-
fers back to the words "every teacher who is the holder of a 
retirement annuity contract with the Teachers' Insurance 
and Annuity Association of America" etc. Our division point 
is, as to whether or not the word "contributes" refers back 
to the word "contract" which says "contract with the Teach-
ers' Insurance and Annuity Association of America" etc. 
We agree with the defendants when they state on page 
11 of their brief: 
"It must be assumed that the legislature was 
familiar with the fact that some of the teachers of 
Utah held contracts such as that held by plaintiff" 
and "that such contracts were not assignable". 
The situation is as stated by the defendants in their 
first brief: 
"The contract cannot be forfeited, canceled or 
assigned." Page 20. 
In other words there is no disagreement between the 
parties in this case that a "teacher who is the holder of a re-
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tirement contract wtih the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity 
Association of America as provided in Section 12 of the act 
cannot dispossess himself of it by assignment." Therefore, 
the words "in which the State of Utah, or any subdivision 
thereof, contributes part of the premium under said con-
tract" must refer to the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity 
Association of America contracts, for the reason that the 
provisio would mean nothing if it did not. The legislature 
knew that the contracts could not be assigned, and so it ex-
pressly provided, that any teacher who was the holder of 
such contract could cause the state to cease making payments 
upon the premium and, therefore, "forthwith become a mem-
ber of the system." 
We have now answered the brief of the defendants to 
page 12 thereof. At the top of page 12 they set out the only 
other heading, which they argued in their brief:-
"ASSUMING THAT THE LANGUAGE OF 
SECTION 12, CHAPTER 85, LAWS. OF UTAH 
1937, IS SO UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS AS 
TO PERMIT OF OR REQUIRE CONSTRUCTION, 
STILL A CONSTRUCTION SHOULD BE GIVEN 
EXCLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM MEMBERSHIP 
IN THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM." 
This matter was covered in its entirety in the first pre-
sentation of the case. 
From this point on we shall answer the balance of the 
defendants' brief and in connection therewith present an 
argument, which we believe completely meets the dissenting 
opinion filed. 
Beginning with page 13 of the deefndants' brief, the de-
fendants attempt to prove that the plaintiff by becoming a 
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member of the state system causes the State of Utah to lose 
something that it has paid into the Carnegie system. They 
also claim that the plaintiff will receive "double beenfits" if 
he is permitted to become a member of the state system. If 
it were not for the apparent belief of the writer of the dis-
senting opinion that the plaintiff would receive double bene-
fits, we would believe that the attorneys for the defendants 
were willfully misrepresenting the facts. At no time has the 
plaintiff contended that he is entitled to credit for prior ser-
vice, from and including November 1, 1923, to and including 
December 31, 1937, the time during which the University 
contributed in his behalf to the Carnegie system. In fact it 
is stated in the plaintiff's first brief that he is not entitled 
to such credit and it was so stated in the argument before 
this Court. We believe, and admit, that the plaintiff is not 
entitled to credit for such prior service during the period 
stated, because of Subsection 6 of Section 3 of the act. It is 
as follows: 
"Prior Service' shall mean service rendered 
prior to July 1, 1937, in a status requisite for mem-
bership in the retirement system." 
This provision can mean only one thing and that is, that 
the plaintiff is not entitled to credit for prior service during 
the period mentioned. This is the only and entire period that 
the State of Utah contributed part of the premium to the 
Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of America 
contract. 
At this point we also wish to state that it appears to us 
that the defendants at all times since the plaintiff attempted 
to be considered a member of the state system, have tried to 
prejudice his cause by representing that he, the plaintiff, 
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was dishonestly attempting to force the State of Utah to 
pay him double benefits. The defendant, Milton B. Taylor, 
at all times since the case started was and still is the execu-
tive secretary of the Utah Educational Association. He went 
so far as to bring this matter before the house of delegates 
of the Utah Educational Association with resulting newspa-
per publicity taking issue with the decision of this Court 
holding in favor of the plaintiff. There was quite an article 
in the daily newspapers on the subject. We can see no rea-
son why, Milton B. Taylor and the house of delegates of the 
Utah Educational Association, did as they did, except for the 
purpose of getting the matter in the newspapers in an at-
tempt improperly and unethically to put pressure on this 
Court to decide in favor of the defendants on their rehearing, 
which, at that time, was pending. The morals and ethics of 
the teaching profession are popularly supposed to be higher 
than those of the legal profession. Most lawyers would not 
think of attempting such a thing. Mr. Taylor and the defend-
ants have smugly asked former Justice Elias Hansen, office 
associate of Mr. Hilton, to appear as a friend of the Court in 
this case, representing the Utah Educational Association, 
and to make it appear that the Utah Educational Associa-
tion has voluntarily taken the matter up in the interests of 
what it thinks is right. It is our understanding that the Utah 
Educational Association originally hired Mr. Hilton in this 
case. At any rate the facts cannot be dsputed that the de-
fendant, Milton B. Taylor, as executive secretary of the Utah 
Educational Association, is one of the moving spirits in this 
matter and he is one of those vitally interested in defeating 
the plaintiff's contention. We do not believe that the large 
membership of the Utah Educational Association under-
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stands this case, and apparently its house of delegates, 
which we understand comprises only a small part of the en-
tire organization, merely rubber-stamped the actions of its 
executive secretary, Milton B. Taylor, and approved his re-
port to it. 
Upon retirement the plaintiff will obtain monthly pay-
ments from his contract with the Carnegie Association, as 
and for the full amount and for the period of time only, that 
the payments were made. There will be no loss of the state 
payments to this fund, either to the plaintiff or to the State 
of Utah, or any subdivision thereof, and it will not react to 
the detriment of the state or any taxpayer or other teachers, 
and could not be construed as an abandonment of said con-
tract as argued in the brief of the defendants. There will 
not be duplication payments made by the State of Utah for 
the period from 1923 to 1937 or for any portion of that time 
because the act expressly provides against it. The represen-
tation that the plaintiff will receive double benefits is entire-
ly untrue. The State of Utah, will lose nothing, Milton B. 
Taylor will lose nothing, the other defendants will lose noth-
ing, the Utah Educational Association wi'll lose nothing, and 
the taxpayers will lose less, as hereinafter stated, for that 
particular time. 
The plaintiff is not abandoning his contract with the 
Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of America. 
He is only to receive benefits from it for the period from No-
vember 1, 1923, to December 31, 1937, upon retirement. He 
will be credited under the state system for prior service for 
the period before 1923, when he was a teacher. 
On page 17 of the defendants' brief they state, as 
follows-
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"Moreover, if a teacher in the same class as the 
plaintiff once establishes his eligibility for member-
ship in the Utah State Teachers' Retirement Sys-
tem there is no provision in the act whereby his elig-
ibility shall terminate if he shall later decide to re-
instate the contract upon which the University of 
Utah has paid a part of the premiums." 
This statement is incorrect. As proof that defendants 
know that said statement is incorrect they have quoted on 
page 20 of their brief the very provisions of Section 21 of 
the Act which shows that said statement is incorrect. The 
portion of said Section 21, is as follows: 
"For the purpose of this section, the holder of a 
retirement annuity contract with the Teachers' In-
surance and Annuity Association of America or 
with any other private organization or company, in 
which the State of Utah or any subdivision thereof 
contributes part of the premium under said con-
tract, shall be considered permanent separation 
from service in status requisite to membership 
herein." 
The statement made by the defendants on page 18 of 
their brief that "the plaintiff and other teachers similarly 
situated may continue to indefinitely shift their position by 
being entitled to membership in the state system for one 
month or more, and then upon a change of mind return to the 
Teachers' Annuity and Insurance Association of America or 
some other private organization" is not true because of the 
provision of the law just quoted above. 
We have carefully read and reread the argument ad-
vanced by the defendants on page 19 and the very top of page 
20 of their brief in an attempt to determine some logic in it. 
We admit our total inability to do so. In the first place, part 
of it is based upon the false_ premise that a teacher who is a 
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holder of a Carnegie contract on the date the act takes ef-
fect is thereafter disqualified from becoming a member of 
the state system. We further wish to state in this connec-
tion, that a member of the state system has a right to trans-
fer to the Carnegie system and take all of the funds with him 
that the State of Utah has contributed for him into the state 
system. Once he has done so, however, he can never return 
to the state system because of the provisions of Section 21 
hereinabove quoted. The law permits a holder of a Carnegie 
contract to transfer to the state system but it, of course, can-
not require him to take the money that the state has contrib-
uted to the Carnegie contract and deposit it in the state sys-
tem. Hence the provision set forth in !Subsection 6 of Sec-
tion 3 of the act which prevents him from receiving credit 
for that period for prior service. Said subsection is as fol-
lows: 
"Prior Service' shall mean service rendered to 
July 1, 1937, in a status requisite for membership in 
the retirement system." 
On pages 20 and 21 of the defendants' brief they at-
tempt to show that the prevailing opinion is wrong in the 
construction given of Section 21. The argument is so foolish 
that we do not believe it necessary to attempt to set out a de-
tailed answer. They, however, complain, because they say, 
the word "only" is interpolated in the section. The act it-
self so provides. It does not use the word "only" but it states 
"for the purpose of this section". This excludes it from ap-
plying to any other sections of the act. The entire argu-
ment of defendants completely ignores the portion just quot-
ed above of said section and is, therefore, based entirely upon 
a false premise, while the prevailing opinion takes this sec-
tion into consideration and is entirely logical and clear. 
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On page 25 of the defendants' brief, they state as 
follows: 
"That evidence may be introduced when a sta-
tute is uncertain and hence requires construction 
for the purpose of shedding light on the legislative 
purpose and hence legislative intent, finds support 
in both textbooks and adjudicated cases." 
The defendants have spent the entire first half of their 
brief in arguing that the Supreme Court was entirely wrong 
in attempting to make a construction of and construe the 
language of the statute in question because, as stated by the 
defendants, "the language is certain and unambiguous". 
They have in this portion of the brief entirely changed their 
position and apparently ask this Court to grant a rehearing 
on the ground that the statute is uncertain and ambiguous. 
We take cognizance of the fact that the defendants in the 
heading of the second portion of their brief state that "As-
suming that the language of Section 12, Chapter 85, Laws of 
Utah 1937, is so uncertain and ambiguous as to permit of 
or require a construction" etc. They have, however, appar-
ently abandoned the "assuming", for the sake of argument, 
in making the statement just quoted above on page 25 of 
their brief. 
On page 26 of the defendants' brief they refer to 
"agents, some of the faculty of the Agricultural College who 
were engaged in experimental work are eligible for and do 
hold contracts with the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity 
Association". We wish to point out, however, that the per-
sons mentioned are not teaching, but are merely doing exper-
imental work on farms or experimental work at the college, 
and are, therefore, not teachers as defined by the act in Sec-
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tion 3, Subsection 3. Consequently, they are not eligible for 
membership in the state system in spite of the contention of 
the defendants. 
According to the act a member of the Teachers' Retire-
ment System upon retirement is entitled to compensation 
composed of three parts. First, an annuity which shall be 
the actuarial equivalent of his accumulated contributions. 
Secondly, a pension bought by the state equal to the above 
annuity. Thirdly, an additional pension determined by the 
number of years of prior service of the teacher. The dissent-
ing opinion seems to resolve about the amount paid under 
this prior service section of the statute, whether or not 
plaintiff will receive double benefits and whether or not the 
reserve funds of the Teachers' Retirement System will be 
put in jeopardy by great numbers of teachers from the Uni-
versity transferring from the Teachers' Insurance and An-
nuity Association of America to the State Teachers' Retire-
ment Bystem. These two points (two of the major points 
in Justice Wolfe's dissenting opinion) will be answered in the 
above order. 
The Teachers' Retirement Act, Section 27, provides for 
the amount of retirement allowance; Subsection (3) de-
clares the amount to be "an additional pension purchased by 
the contributions of the state, which shall be equal to one-
seventieth, except as provided in the sentence next following, 
of his final compensation multiplied by the number of years 
of prior service credited to him ..... " 
The legislature then very carefully provided that dou-
ble benefits could not be obtained by any teacher by defining 
"prior service" in Section 3, Subsection 6 as follows: 
"Prior service' shall mean service rendered 
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prior to July 1, 1937, in a status requisite for mem-
bership in the retirement system." 
We make no claim that from November, 1923, to De-
cember, 1937, plaintiff was serving in a "status requisite for 
membership". We concede that for the above time plaintiff 
is not eligible to receive credit for prior service in his retire-
ment allowance. Under the prior service clause--Section 27 
-if plaintiff had never belonged to the Teachers' Insurance 
and Annuity Association of America he would have received 
credit as prior service for the period from July 1, 1904 to July 
1, 1937. This would amount to 33 x $2500- $1178.57 per 
70 
annum. Due to the term from November 1923 to December 
1937, during which the State of Utah contributed to the 
Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of America 
plaintiff can only hope for a prior service allowance of 19 1 13 
70 
x $2500- $690.48 per year. The Teachers Retirement 
System will pay the plaintiff in this case $488.09 less per 
year than it would have been obliged to pay had not the 
plaintiff had a contract with the Teachers' Insurance and 
Annuity Association of America from November 1923 to 
December 1937. During the entire time covered by the 
"prior service" section of the statute the State of Utah con-
tributed on behalf of plaintiff the sum of $2475 to the 
Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of America. 
If plaintiff lives for 15 years after retirement the Teachers' 
Retirement System will save $488.09 per annum due to the 
fact that he held a contract to which the State of Utah con-
tributed for 14 years. This will amount to $7321.35 during 
the 15 years. In other words if plaintiff lives 15 years after 
he retires the state of Utah will have saved $7321.35 minus 
$2475.00 (amount paid to the Teachers' Insurance and An-
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nuity Assocition of America) or a total of $4846.35. If 
plaintiff lives 20 years after retirement the state will have 
saved $7286.80. Instead of it being a financial burden on 
the state for teachers in the University to have been mem-
bers of the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of 
America we see that the !State of Utah realizes a great finan-
cial gain under this act due to such membership. 
The only reason that a teacher who is the holder of a 
contract with the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Associa-
tion of America would transfer to the State Teachers' Retire-
ment System would be to obtain credit for prior service. Sec-
tion 9, Subsection (e) states in part: 
" Credit for prior service shall be grant-
ed to each member who has rendered such se:;_·vice 
as defined herein and who enters the retirement 
service prior to July 1, 1938 ---". 
It is thus seen that there will be no general flow of 
teachers from the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Associa-
tion of America to the Teachers' Retirement System, because 
there is no inducement for them to transfer after July 1, 
1938. As nearly as we can determine there are only 3 other 
teachers in the State of Utah who are eligible for prior ser-
vice due to the fact that no other teachers have joined the 
Retirement System by having the State of Utah cease mak-
ing contributions to the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity 
Association of America before July 1, 1938. Instead of a 
flow from the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association 
of America to the State Teachers' Retirement System the 
flow will be in the other direction as the younger teachers in 
the University will leave the state system as soon as possible 
for the Carnegie system due to the greater annual payments 
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per year from the Carnegie system than from the state sys-
tem. 
As stated before the only reason and purpose for teach-
ers to transfer from the Carnegie system to the state system 
would be to obtain the benefits acquired under the "prior ser-
vice" section. 
If the teacher is not an elderly teacher and has not a 
great many years of prior service there exists no reason for 
changing and he will consequently not try to do so. That is 
the reason why only 3 other teachers have ceased making 
payments to the Carnegie system and have attempted to 
join the state system. 
From the above argument it is immediately obvious that 
there cannot be double benefits and that the strain on the re-
serves of the state system can be immediately determined 
by the Retirement Board and will not, in any event, be of 
such great magnitude as to endanger these reserves. 
We have carefully read the discussion in the dissenting 
opinion on the construction of Section 12 of the act. We be-
lieve that the opinion does not take into consideration the 
reason for the disqualifications stated and the result that 
the legislature attempted to reach. The State of Utah would 
not be concerned because some person was the holder of a 
Carnegie contract or because he was a contributing member 
to the Carnegie system. The state becomes interested for 
only one reason and that is, when and because the State of 
Utah contributes part of the premium. It is our opinion that 
the main reason that the legislature made the change in the 
language from the act as originally written was for the rea-
son just stated. 
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This idea was inserted in Subsection "b" of Section 12, 
so as to disqualify holders of Carnegie contracts as long as 
the State of Utah was contributing. There would be no rea-
son or justice in the state disqualifying a man just because 
he happened to be a holder of a contract if the State of Utah 
had never contributed. The defendants agree with this con-
struction as heretofore shown in this brief. There are two 
other facts that we believe have not been sufficiently stress-
ed heretofore, which tend strongly to support the view of the 
plaintiff as to the proper construction of the act. The por-
tion in question is, as follows: 
"The following teachers shall be excluded from 
membership in the retirement system: 
"(a)--
"(b) Every teacher who is the holder of are-
tirement annuity contract with the Teachers' Insur-
ance and Annuity Association of America or with 
any other private organization or company, in which 
the state of Utah, or any subdivision thereof con-
tributes part of the premium, under said contract; 
provided, however, that every such teacher, upon 
ceasing to be a holder of such contract and being 
otherwise eligible to membership in this system, 
shall forthwith become a member of the system." 
It is to be noted that the first comma, in the sub-para-
graph precedes the words "in which the state of Utah, or any 
subdivision thereof contributes part of the premium". The 
comma sets off the preceding part of the paragraph and 
places all of it in the same class. We also submit that if the 
argument in the dissenting opinion were correct then the 
portion "contributes part of the premium" would only refer 
to the word "company" and would not refer to the words 
"with any other private organization" because "company" is 
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preceded by "or" just the same as "with any other private 
organization" is preceded by "or", and there is no punctua-
tion separating the latter part of said paragraph which is "or 
with any other private organization or company" from the 
preceding part which is "that every teacher who is a holder 
of a contract with the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity As-
sociation of America". 
The proviso says : 
"That every such teacher, upon ceasing to be 
the holder of such contract"- "shall forthwith be-
come a member of the system". 
"Such contract" refers back to the word "contract" in 
the second line in the subsection and is the only word to 
which it could refer. Without the use of the word "contract" 
in the second line of said subsection the portion as to private 
organization or company would not make sense, which shows 
conclusively that the contributing part of the paragraph re-
fers back to the . Carnegie provisions, as well as to the other 
provisions. 
We also desire to specifically call the attention of the 
writer of the dissenting opinion to the words "any other" 
which immediately preceds "private organization or com-
pany". The section reads "Every teacher who is the holder 
of a retirement annuity contract with the Teachers' Insur-
ance and Annuity Association of America or with any other 
private organization or company, in which the State of Utah, 
or any subdivision thereof contributes part of the premium 
under said contract". When the words "any other" are given 
their proper meaning in said section and considered in light 
of the Carnegie provisions, the section would read : 
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"Every teacher who is the holder of a retire-
ment annuity contract with the Teachers' Insurance 
and Annuity Association of America or with any 
other" - "in which the State of Utah or any sub-
division thereof contributes part of the premium 
under said contract." 
Do not the words "any other" definitely tie up the Car-
negie provisions with the words "contributes part of the 
premium"? 
We most sincerely urge and contend that they do. We 
have gone into the matter of the construction of this para-
graph in great detail in our first brief. We respectfully re-
quest the Court to refer to it as a further argument in favor 
of our contention and as a further answer to the contention 
of the defendants. 
The application for a rehearing should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. LAMBERT GIBSON 
MARL D. GIBSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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